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Beyond Business as Usual? Better Buying Power and the 
Prospects for Change in Defense Acquisition 
Zach Huitink—Syracuse University [zshuitin@syr.edu] 
Abstract 
Defense acquisition reform is a now decades-long endeavor, and the historical experience 
begs the question of whether Better Buying Power will succeed where its predecessors have 
not. In this paper, I argue the prospects for change under Better Buying Power are guardedly 
optimistic, but that to understand the challenges of institutionalizing, it we need a new 
perspective. While leadership matters, and the change literature focused on leaders (e.g., 
Kotter, 1996) offers thoughtful prescriptions, leadership is but one factor in a larger 
organizational milieu. More than just a set of principles leaders tout, change initiatives—
acquisition reforms included—are policies with material implications for an organization’s 
various constituencies. In this way, acquisition reform is more profitably viewed as a policy 
implementation problem. Based on a case study involving interviews with a dozen subject 
matter experts and analysis of over 1,000 pages of primary and secondary documents, I 
identified the problems of implementing Better Buying Power along three dimensions 
emphasized in policy implementation research: policy content, organizational capacity, and 
managerial craft. I argue these factors are the primary impediments to institutionalizing Better 
Buying Power, and I suggest ways leaders can address them. Provided they can be 
surmounted, the prospects for change under Better Buying Power are real and viable. 
Introduction 
On September 10, 2001, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave a 
speech. His message: We need to overhaul the Department of Defense—urgently. In short, 
Rumsfeld declared war on the Pentagon bureaucracy, taking aim at everything from human 
resources to financial management to healthcare. He reserved special ire for acquisition, 
arguing “our process and regulations have become so burdensome that many businesses 
have simply chosen not to do business with the Department of Defense” (Rumsfeld, 2001). 
Moreover, existing processes all but guaranteed that the DoD could not leverage industry’s 
capacity for innovation, making purchased weapons “a generation old [the] day they’re 
deployed” (Rumsfeld, 2001). This was not acceptable. Change, the secretary promised, 
would be coming.  
The next day, it did.  
After 9/11, the exigencies of combating global terrorism and prosecuting military 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan eclipsed Rumsfeld’s other war. In the interest of national 
security, Congress approved budgets ensuring growth in the DoD’s teeth and its tail. As 
Gansler and Lucyshyn (2013) argue, this budget growth “produced some significant 
successes [e.g., mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs)]” but otherwise 
obscured persistent, mediocre acquisition performance.  
Fast forward almost a decade. On May 8, 2010, then Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates gave a speech of his own. Standing in the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, KS, he 
argued “[given] America’s difficult economic circumstances and perilous fiscal condition, 
military spending on things large and small can and should expect closer, harsher scrutiny. 
The gusher has been turned off, and will stay off for a good period of time” (Gates, 2010a). 
To withstand subsequent reductions in appropriations, Gates launched the Defense 
Efficiency Initiative, an effort to reduce tail spending while protecting the Department’s 
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investments in readiness, force structure, and capability modernization (see Dagget, 2010; 
Gates, 2010b).  
Out of the Defense Efficiency Initiative came Better Buying Power (BBP), the 
defense acquisition community’s response to the call for greater efficiency in Pentagon 
spending. Now in its second iteration (Better Buying Power 2.0, launched in November, 
2012), BBP represents a concerted effort to maximize the value of every dollar the DoD 
spends on procuring goods and services (Carter, 2010).  
After over a decade of combat, and with the government at a fiscal inflection point, 
BBP’s relevance and timeliness are arguably beyond doubt. That said, in this paper I ask 
the following question: Is this time really different? If defense acquisition reform is truly 
elusive (Fox, 2012), what are the prospects for change under Better Buying Power? Should 
we expect significant improvements in the near future? Or is BBP merely window dressing, a 
paper tiger with little or no chance of breaking through an entrenched system?  
My answer: neither. Based on interviews with a dozen subject matter experts and 
analysis of over 1,000 pages of primary and secondary documents, I believe one can point 
to suggestive evidence that BBP is having some impact on acquisition. Moreover, I argue 
that the prospects for change are guardedly optimistic. While I do not think BBP will solve (or 
is even designed to solve) all the problems plaguing defense acquisition, I do think there is a 
chance the initiative will yield improvements. To sustain these improvements, however, I 
argue we need to view the problem through a different lens. While researchers and 
practitioners have written much about organizational change, including in the context of 
defense acquisition (e.g., see Eide & Allen, 2012), it is time to move beyond discussions 
about the general antecedents of successful transformation (e.g., the eight-step model 
presented in Kotter, 1996) and think more systematically about how initiatives like BBP are 
implemented in complex organizations.  
When seen from this view, the challenge of transforming defense acquisition opens 
itself to examination via a host of relevant ideas from public administration and management 
scholarship. Drawing on these ideas in the course of my own research led me to identify the 
challenges of implementing Better Buying along three dimensions, as articulated in highly-
cited research on policy implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Goggin, 1986): 
policy content, organizational capacity, and personnel qualifications (what Goggin calls “will 
and skill,” and what I hereafter refer to as managerial craft). Collectively, these factors 
capture what I see as the primary impediments to institutionalizing Better Buying Power. 
Provided they can be surmounted, I believe the possibility for informed change is real and 
viable. 
Summary of Findings 
In brief, my findings are as follows.  
Policy content. With respect to policy content, Better Buying Power does not 
represent a revolution in thinking about defense acquisition. Indeed, insofar as it 
emphasizes many practices already written in law and policy, one could argue we should 
not even call it reform (for the sake of relating it to past initiatives, however, I will use that 
term throughout the paper). Moreover, the consensus view among the subject matter 
experts I interviewed is that BBP is an integrated program whose parts fit together well. 
While a few interviewees pointed to shortcomings in specific action items (some of which the 
AT&L leadership addressed in transitioning from BBP 1.0 to BBP 2.0), they generally did not 
see BBP’s seven major themes as working against one another. That said, interviewees 
pointed to a number of issues with how BBP is perceived, among both the government 
acquisition workforce and industry.  
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On the workforce side, interviewees cautioned that program personnel may be 
uncertain as to how BBP will impact their interests, and whether DoD leadership can 
credibly commit to enforcing BBP principles at particular decision points. For it to be 
sustainable, BBP must, in the eyes of the workforce, distribute benefits and costs in a 
manner that accords with the initiative’s stated objectives. If leaders permit programs that 
are not achieving better buying power—those consuming more and more resources for 
fewer and fewer purchased units—to proceed through the acquisition cycle, while reneging 
on promises to reward those who deliver at or below budget via practices like should cost 
analysis, they reduce the workforce’s incentives to adopt BBP practices.  
On the industry side, interviewees noted that BBP’s emphasis on incentivizing 
productivity and reducing non-valued added compliance costs are a positive. In their view, 
however, the initiative fails to address several long-standing problems that make it difficult to 
do business with the Pentagon. Moreover, while the individuals interviewed see defense 
acquisition as a business-oriented function, interviewees representing both government and 
industry pointed to persistent deficiencies in how the DoD measures and manages its costs. 
The individuals with whom I spoke repeatedly referenced the “spend culture” that 
encourages government personnel to spend all the resources made available to them over 
the relevant budgetary period (lest they be allocated less funds in future periods). Insofar as 
BBP emphasizes getting a good business deal for the government—for instance, delaying 
obligation of funds for the sake of getting more favorable contract terms—punishing 
individuals for not spending money fast enough is, in the words of a senior DoD official I 
interviewed, “totally in the face of what we are trying to accomplish.” 
Organizational capacity. With respect to organizational capacity—the degree to 
which organizations can implement policy through their formal structures and processes 
(Goggin, 1986; Ting, 2011)—BBP’s prospects appear more mixed. Owing to established 
governance mechanisms—milestone assessments, portfolio reviews, and procedures 
intended to promote jointness and reduce unnecessary overlap in capabilities (e.g., 
configuration steering boards)—interviewees suggested the DoD’s components will be more 
able to implement BBP practices in hardware acquisition than in the acquisition of services 
(where these mechanisms are largely absent). Even in the hardware area, however, 
implementation is likely to vary given differences in the organization and functioning of 
individual components’ acquisition activities. For example, while senior acquisition officials in 
each of the military departments have expressed their support for and commitment to BBP, 
interviewees still expressed concern that the services will respond to and operationalize the 
initiative differently in the management of their own programs.  
Managerial craft. With respect to managerial craft—skilled application of individual 
strategic, tactical, and technical capabilities and competencies (Hill & Lynn, 2009)—the 
prospects for BBP are arguably the most uncertain. Getting a good business deal for the 
government requires situational awareness and sound judgment in the conduct of one’s 
day-to-day work. Acknowledging both repeated calls to strengthen the acquisition workforce 
(e.g., see Gansler, 2011; Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2013), and the DoD’s efforts to build its 
internal capacity in this area (GAO, 2011), it remains unclear whether BBP can overcome 
the incentives that perpetuate a culture of risk aversion and adherence to standard 
operating procedure among government personnel. As aspects of BBP 1.0’s experience 
suggest, there is still a tendency in the workforce to interpret guidance as rules rather than 
suggested best practices. Reflecting on this issue, interviewees referenced the complexity of 
many acquisition decisions—evaluating sources on a best value basis, selecting appropriate 
contract types, judiciously leveraging commercial vs. proprietary technology, etc.—and in 
some cases expressed concern about whether the existing system gives the workforce the 
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appropriate training and incentives to make decisions that balance performance, risk, and 
affordability. Successful implementation of BBP, however, depends importantly on tolerating 
failure, encouraging trial-and-error type learning in the course of decision-making, and 
facilitating knowledge transfer across the spectrum of the acquisition discipline.  
Plan for the Paper 
I proceed as follows. In the first section—Better Buying Power in Comparative and 
Historical Perspective—I offer a broad stroke summary of past acquisition reform efforts and 
attempt to locate BBP within the patchwork of these reforms. In the second section—The 
Challenge of Change—I review existing scholarship on organizational change, discuss 
some of the drawbacks inherent in applying this literature to defense acquisition reform, and 
describe an alternative set of ideas from the public administration and management 
literature that I believe can be applied usefully to BBP. In the third section—Better Buying 
Power: Beyond Business as Usual?—I draw on these ideas to lay out my case study of BBP 
and present my findings in greater detail. I follow with a short conclusion.  
Better Buying Power in Comparative and Historical Perspective 
If the defense acquisition system remains mired in a business-as-usual malaise, it is 
not for lack of attention. For over six decades, Congress, the President, and DoD leaders 
have wrestled with how to make the Pentagon’s acquisition practices more efficient and 
effective. A comprehensive review of this history is far beyond my purposes (see Fox, 2012), 
but I believe we must in some measure consult the past if we are to understand BBP’s 
future.  
To seasoned practitioners and researchers, little (if any) of what I say in this section 
will come as a surprise, so I will put it succinctly: In both form and substance, Better Buying 
Power is mostly not new. Leaders come and go, slogans change, and ideas get recycled. 
Both across stakeholders and over time, however, recommendations to “fix” defense 
acquisition have much in common. This is not to ignore important differences of opinion—
they exist—but it is to say that the various blue ribbon commissions, panels, reports, studies, 
and hearings organized to examine the issue often arrive at similar conclusions (Fox, 2012). 
Thus, “if we all know what needs to be done,” the question—as David Packard asked—truly 
is “why aren’t we doing it?” 
To answer the “why?” question, I believe we need to first consider “who?” and 
“how?” While simple, these questions are valuable in that they shift our attention from the 
substance of reform to the management and implementation issues with which I am 
concerned in this paper. Therefore, to put BBP in an historical context, let’s consider the 
“who?” and “how?” questions in turn.  
In a sense, the answer to the “who?” question is simple: everyone. As noted above, 
Congress, the President, and the Pentagon’s leaders have all addressed defense 
acquisition at one point or another. They have at times worked together, worked alone, and 
in some cases worked at cross purposes.  
When they choose to do so, Congress and the President can wield significant 
influence. Harnessing its powers to legislate, appropriate, and investigate, as well as hold 
hearings and commission studies, Congress has taken a number of actions over the 
decades with far reaching implications for how the Pentagon purchases goods and services 
(particularly major weapons systems). Likewise, as commander-in-chief, the President can 
set the broad contours of American national security policy, including defense policy, and 
through the annual budgeting process express preferences for certain material capabilities 
over others.  
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Despite these powers, however, neither Congress nor the President possesses the 
expertise, the information, and the knowledge of specific circumstances that the Pentagon’s 
leaders enjoy. Both, therefore, must rely on the DoD to put their policies in place.  
Of course, while the DoD is often an implementing agent, it is not exclusively reactive 
in terms of its actions. Like all government agencies, it is a purposive organization (Rainey, 
2009) with its own goals and objectives. In pursuing these, the Pentagon’s leaders regularly 
exercise their authority to adjust aspects of planning, budgeting, human resources, and 
acquisition. Thus, insofar as current and recently departed office holders within the DoD’s 
AT&L division designed and launched BBP, it is best placed within the panoply of past 
acquisition reforms initiated by senior DoD leadership.  
Compared to congressional and presidential action, how do reforms of this kind 
proceed? In theory, one could argue that the process should be simple: A leader orders a 
change in practice, and subordinates follow suit. This clear link between authority and action 
is the sin qua non of formal organization: Hierarchy ensures words spoken at one level 
translate into deeds at another.  
Unfortunately, the DoD’s history with internal reform illustrates that things are much 
more complicated. The power accompanying a position of authority—secretary, deputy 
secretary, and the host of offices underneath them—is real but far from absolute. Indeed, 
even after the department’s creation in 1949—at which time Congress placed a civilian 
secretary between the President and the military services, and empowered this individual to 
direct acquisition programs—“[throughout the 1950s] the services retained much of their 
autonomy in the [acquisition] arena” (Converse, 2012, p. vi).  
Starting in the 1960s, the DoD’s civilian leadership began asserting their authority 
over acquisition programs, in effect launching a managerial experiment that continues with 
BBP.  
Seeking to wrestle control from the services, Secretary Robert McNamara initiated a 
series of changes intended to empower the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) vis-à-
vis the military departments. Notable initiatives included the PPBS budgeting method, 
systems analysis, and a variety of changes in contracting practices (e.g., Total Package 
Procurement). McNamara also championed the program manager concept, reflecting his 
belief that to the greatest extent possible, authority and control over acquisition programs 
should be vested in a single individual.  
Despite producing “a number of positive results” (Fox, 2012, p. 37) the services 
strongly resisted McNamara’s reforms. Even among those receptive to the ideas, “limited 
managerial training” meant they “lacked the knowledge and skill necessary to implement the 
new policies, directives, and techniques” (Fox, 2012, p. 39). 
Upon assuming office in 1970, Deputy Secretary David Packard attempted to 
decentralize the acquisition function. Motivated by his private sector experience with 
management by objectives, he retained OSD’s prerogative to set policy, conduct reviews, 
and make decisions at major milestones. Otherwise, however, he returned to the services 
authority McNamara sought for the civilian leadership.  
As with McNamara, the Achilles’ heel of Packard’s reform efforts lied in their 
assumption that the acquisition workforce possessed the prerequisite knowledge and skills 
to manage programs in accordance with leader-established objectives—all while subject to 
minimal oversight. As argued in Fox, “this assumption turned out to be only partially correct” 
(Fox, 2012, p. 61). Moreover, instead of harnessing their autonomy to implement best 
practices, even skilled program personnel tended to fall “back on established management 
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methods” (Fox, 2012, p. 61) and pursued individual acquisitions in a manner befitting 
service- rather than OSD-level interests. 
The issue of service versus OSD interests persisted into the 1980s, by which time 
defense acquisition problems had received so much attention as to make “reform a [litany]” 
(Fox, 2012, p. 99). As such, the ideas promulgated in Secretary Caspar Weinberger’s and 
Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci’s Acquisition Improvement Program (AIP) strongly 
reflected “practices dating back to the 1960s” (Fox, 2012, p. 99).  
In channeling historical efforts, the Carlucci initiatives—31 (later, 32) action items 
addressing various aspects of budgeting, requirements determination, contracting, and 
human resources—point to another trend in the pattern of reform: Compared to McNamara’s 
and (to perhaps a lesser extent) Packard’s efforts, the Carlucci program was more 
evolutionary than revolutionary than in character. His initiatives were not the manifestation of 
a new, underlying management philosophy, but were instead an amalgamation of numerous 
ideas developed under both centralized and decentralized managerial styles pursued in the 
previous two decades.  
How did these initiatives fair? Once again, poorly. While “the anticipated outcomes of 
AIP … looked good on paper, implementation at the service level was far more difficult to 
achieve” (Fox, 2012, p. 100; see also GAO, 1986). In a manner similar to Packard’s reforms, 
the Carlucci initiatives seemed to suffer from a tension between empowering the services 
with one hand and holding them accountable with the other. Insofar as the initiatives built on 
existing best practices, one could argue issues with responsiveness and accountability 
cannot be blamed on insufficient skill and understanding among service-level acquisition 
managers. And to an extent, it appears the services simply circumvented AIP in the interest 
of following established operating procedures (Fox, 2012). In my view, such behavior 
probably reflects a mix of resistance and insufficient technical capacity (as in either case, 
reliance on existing procedure is the likely outcome). Whatever the exact balance, however, 
it is hard to argue the Carlucci initiatives did not suffer in some way from a lack of 
cooperation by the military departments.  
Building on the momentum of the Packard Commission and the Section 800 Panel, 
acquisition reform greatly accelerated in the 1990s. The Congress, the President, and DoD 
leaders all took aim at aspects of the process. Upon penning his “Mandate for Change” 
memo, Deputy Secretary (later Secretary) William Perry—with support from both Congress 
and President Clinton—launched a streamlining effort intended to make defense acquisition 
“faster, better, and cheaper.” As described in Fox (2012), Perry and his colleagues went to 
great lengths to institutionalize their ideas, including establishing reform organizations in 
both OSD and the services, advocating for pilot testing legislation (so as to experiment with 
individual initiatives on a small scale), striving to measure and communicate progress on the 
reform movement, and updating the 5000 series guidance.  
Looking back, it is hard to argue that the 1990s era reforms did not achieve at least 
some success. By reducing reliance on milspecs, for example, the collective efforts of the 
DoD and policymakers in Congress and the White House resulted in lasting improvements 
to requirements generation. As with so many of the initiatives pursued in these years, 
however, it is near impossible to isolate a clear relationship between reform and changes in 
outcomes (let alone disentangle the relative contributions of lawmakers, the administration, 
and the DoD). Moreover, a RAND study cited in Fox (2012) suggests workforce personnel 
did not deem the acquisition reform movement a mission accomplished. While 
acknowledging numerous benefits of the policies pursued in the 90s, respondents to 
RAND’s surveys and interviews cited persistent disconnects among acquisition’s various 
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functional disciplines, as well as continued lack of authority to manage the risk inherent in 
implementing many of the reform initiatives.  
We will never know whether and to what extent the tide of reform, along with 
progress on outstanding problems, would have proceeded in the 2000s; 9/11 makes this 
experience an unobservable counterfactual. As Gansler and Lucyshyn (2013) argue, 
however, the DoD’s rapid budget growth—including increases in both the base budget and 
funding for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—obscured persistent problems in the 
defense acquisition process. These issues prompted the Pentagon to undertake a major 
assessment of its acquisition practices, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 
(DAPA) Panel, commissioned by Deputy Secretary Gordon England. Released in January 
2006, the DAPA report contemplated significant changes in the organization and conduct of 
acquisition. Echoing DAPA’s observations, the House Armed Services Committee report 
accompanying the fiscal 2007 defense authorization bill plainly labeled the DoD’s acquisition 
process “broken” (see Schwartz, 2013, p. 1). Clearly, and despite some notable 
improvement efforts launched in the course of fighting two wars (e.g., configuration steering 
boards), defense acquisition reform remained elusive into the mid and late 2000s (Fox, 
2012). 
Enter Better Buying Power. Launched in accordance with Secretary Gates’ Defense 
Efficiency Initiative, BBP represents the latest evolution in the DoD’s own efforts to improve 
its acquisition activities.  
Even a cursory examination of the BBP initiatives highlights their similarity with 
previous reforms. Indeed, themes like “promoting effective competition,” “reducing 
unproductive processes and bureaucracy,” and “incentivizing productivity in industry and 
government” are, if not worded the same, still clearly aligned with the thrust of past reform 
efforts. Moreover, BBP’s implementation process bears at least some resemblance to 
several of its predecessors, particularly the Carlucci initiatives. As with the Carlucci effort, 
BBP is expressed as a list of nearly three dozen individual improvement actions, to be 
implemented in an evolutionary fashion with support from champions at various levels in 
OSD and the services.  
Whether BBP will build on and extend past success remains an open question. 
Those looking for an answer typically consult research on organizational change, especially 
studies addressing culture change. Based on published statements from senior defense 
officials, as well as data from my own interviews, I believe this is an appropriate 
characterization. However, affecting change—including and especially via the cultural 
route—requires careful consideration of the structural and managerial factors that may 
impede the change proponents’ efforts. As argued in the next section, the literature typically 
cited in discussions of change in the defense acquisition community is not sufficient for the 
sake of diagnosing the problem. While that literature offers useful prescriptions, it does not 
offer a systematic framework for evaluating the challenges of implementing change in 
complex organizations.  
The Challenge of Change 
In the study of organizations, change is the subject of a massive scholarly and 
professional literature. One review of academic efforts, conducted in the mid-1990s, counted 
a million published articles for which change was the topic (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). 
Since then, this body of work has only grown. Moreover, academic publication counts do not 
include research published in books, trade journals, and the variety of other media through 
which practitioners communicate with each other about organization and management 
issues.  
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In part, we can attribute the size of the change literature to its complexity as a topic 
of study. Change occurs for numerous reasons. Sometimes factors internal to organizations 
facilitate change; other times change is foist on organizations from without. Sometimes 
change occurs gradually; other times abruptly. Sometimes change is planned; other times it 
occurs without warning or intent.  
As even these few examples suggest, studying change is in large part a challenge of 
developing a vocabulary and a set of conceptual tools to characterize individual cases. 
Indeed, absent some simplifying framework, the sheer variety of factors leading to, 
influencing, and shaping the impact of change is simply overwhelming.  
As suggested in the first section, Better Buying Power in Comparative and Historical 
Perspective, my concern is with planned change of the internally-driven variety. This is not 
to discount other avenues through which defense acquisition could—and has—changed in 
the past (e.g., through action by Congress or the President, in response to needs emerging 
from overseas conflicts and threats, etc.). Again, however, my concern is with internal, 
purposive change.  
Insofar as leaders have played a pivotal role in change of this kind, it is not surprising 
that observers have turned to leader-centric change research to understand their efforts. 
Perhaps the most commonly used studies in this vein are those of John Kotter, a Harvard 
management professor who has done highly influential research on organizational 
transformation in the private sector (e.g., see Kotter, 1996).  
The essence of Kotter’s research is a process-based model involving eight steps: 
ensure the need; form a guiding coalition; create a vision; communicate the vision; empower 
others to act on the vision; plan for and create short-term wins; consolidate improvements 
and produce more change; and institutionalize new approaches. As these steps suggest, 
Kotter is speaking mostly to leaders at the top. Rightly so, as in many enterprises—defense 
acquisition included—change often begins with leaders seeking a new direction. 
But change is not self-executing. Of course, Kotter understands this point. His call to 
form a guiding coalition clearly signals his appreciation for the political nature of 
organizations, and that for the sake of overcoming resistance one needs champions among 
those being asked to act differently (see Kelman, 2006, for further discussion of this issue). 
So to, one must of course ensure the need for change; create, communicate, and empower 
individuals to pursue a change vision; generate early wins; consolidate and build upon those 
wins; and work to solidify behavioral patterns that led to them. These are sensible 
guidelines, and I suspect virtually all leaders would agree with them—even if, as Kotter 
illustrates, they do not always follow through in practice.  
In taking issue with this approach to understanding defense acquisition reform, I am 
not saying it is entirely unhelpful. As Eide and Allen (2013) illustrate, viewing current reform 
efforts through Kotter’s lens points to problems that merit attention. They argue, for instance, 
that the practice of mandating reform at the OSD level is not in and of itself conducive to 
creating a guiding coalition. Likewise, the structural complexity of defense acquisition 
organizations and the variety of stakeholders involved often frustrate leaders’ efforts to 
empower change. In their words, “the way an organization is structured—its rules of 
behavior or formal processes … and the incentives inherent in [its] reward system—can 
thwart [intended] support of any change effort” (Eide & Allen, 2013, p. 113). 
Arguably, these insights allude to the need for a new perspective. We do not have to 
discard Kotter’s approach—as just suggested, using it gives us clues about more 
fundamental issues—but I think we need to complement it with other ideas and concepts. 
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Leadership matters, and leaders would be wise to read Kotter’s research when 
contemplating a change initiative. My point is that there is more to the story. As Eide and 
Allen imply, the link between leadership and cultural change is quite complex. At the very 
least, it involves (i) how an organization is structured, and (ii) how that structure creates 
interests and incentives for the status quo. 
In accounting for these factors, I think we are making an important step. We are no 
longer thinking about leadership per se, but about the challenges leaders encounter when 
attempting to implement change in complex organizations. If we take one more step—to 
view change not just as a vision or a statement of principles, but instead as a policy with 
material implications for various organizational constituencies—I think we open the issue of 
reforming defense acquisition to a host of valuable insights from the public administration 
and management literature. Specifically, I think we open the issue to examination from a 
policy implementation perspective. 
Research in the policy implementation field is not usually concerned with what 
happens in the confines of a single organization. Instead, those who look at implementation 
typically consider how actors put policy in place across levels of government and between 
government and non-governmental entities. As such, the concern is with how federal, state, 
and local governments coordinate their efforts, as well as how they work with private for 
profit and not for profit organizations through tools like contracts, grants, and public–private 
partnerships. Indeed, as an intellectual endeavor, policy implementation is at present very 
“tools-focused” (see Salamon, 2002).  
Despite its emphasis on tools, however, policy implementation also remains true to 
its more classical roots, including a set of basic ideas that still shape thinking about the finer 
points of contracting, grant administration, and forging alliances between government and 
the private sector. As articulated in Pressman’s and Wildavsky’s (1973) now famous case 
study of economic development programs, and in a host of follow-up studies, the core 
concepts underlying implementation remain the same. According to Goggin (1986), these 
are (i) policy content, (ii) organizational capacity, and (iii) personnel qualifications—what he 
calls “will and skill” and what I hereafter refer to as managerial craft.  
What does any of this have to do with defense acquisition reform? In my view, if we 
treat reform as an exercise in implementing policy—still leadership-centric, but involving 
leaders who operate in a complex organizational milieu—we can move beyond emphasizing 
just those conditions necessary for success—having a vision, creating scope for small wins, 
etc.—and start thinking about what is truly sufficient for the sake of successful change. In 
other words, using concepts from policy implementation, we can start to map the 
environment within which reform occurs. We can partition the defense acquisition system 
into individual units of analysis, and ask how each unit’s reception of and responsiveness to 
reform will vary along some basic dimensions. The value of this exercise, is that—in the 
spirit of the conference—it yields a more informed perspective on the prospects for change.  
To assess the prospects for change under Better Buying Power, I report in the next 
section findings from a case study I conducted, using the above-defined ideas from policy 
implementation as an organizing framework.  
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Better Buying Power: Beyond Business as Usual? 
Study Background and Motivation 
Between September 2013 and March 2014, I undertook a case study of the Better 
Buying Power initiative, with the intention of answering some basic questions: What is Better 
Buying Power? How does Better Buying Power compare to past reform efforts? What are its 
goals and objectives? Are they being achieved? Are there any discernible patterns in 
performance, whether across components, product categories, or areas of the initiative 
itself?  
To structure my investigation, I first compared Better Buying Power to historical 
reform efforts, relying extensively on the work of Fox (2012) and others (e.g., Converse, 
2012). Having established this context, and isolated areas of similarity and difference 
between BBP and its predecessors, I turned to theory. To avoid being overwhelmed, I 
needed a set of conceptual tools to guide my inquiry. As implied above, I began with 
research on organizational change, including the leader-centric theories often cited in 
discussions of defense acquisition reform.  
Mapping leader-oriented change theories onto the problem of acquisition reform 
proved problematic. Leadership clearly mattered, but the continual challenges encountered 
by leaders of different backgrounds and managerial styles suggested there was more to the 
story. Cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls persisted despite leaders’ 
efforts to create and communicate a vision, form guiding coalitions, generate short-term 
wins, and otherwise act in accordance with the prescriptions of purposive change models. 
What explained these shortcomings? What frustrated the good intentions and the hard work 
of those intent on improving defense acquisition?  
Treating the historical reform experience as a point of departure, I came to 
understand the conclusion others had long ago reached: The substance of reform is 
arguably not the issue. Indeed, as David Packard argued, our problem is not one of 
ignorance about what to do—it’s why we can’t put into place what we know are good 
practices. In other words, it is a problem of implementation. In designing and executing my 
case study, I thus let the literature on policy implementation be my guide.  
Study Approach 
The essence of the case study involved interviews with a purposive sample of 
subject matter experts selected to give a balanced perspective on Better Buying Power. In 
total, interviews were conducted with a dozen individuals possessing extensive familiarity 
with defense acquisition. To the greatest extent possible, an effort was made to incorporate 
perspectives from three sources: (i) government—including both individuals working in the 
DoD and those tasked with overseeing the DoD’s acquisition activities; (ii) industry—
including members of both industry itself and associations representing industry 
perspectives and concerns; and (iii) the epistemic community—including individuals in both 
academia and in non-academic institutions performing acquisition-related research.  
Each interview proceeded for approximately 45 minutes, under a semi-structured 
approach: Interviewees were asked the same set of questions, and depending on their 
responses, were asked follow-up questions to further probe topics that emerged during the 
course of the interview. Thus, an attempt was made to elicit each expert’s opinions and 
analysis on the same set of issues, while also allowing them to share their unsolicited views. 
Doing so allowed for the possibility that consistent themes would emerge across multiple 
interviews, without crowding each interviewee’s opportunity to offer insights more specific to 
their point of view. 
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The interviews were supplemented with analysis of over 1,000 pages of documents, 
including both primary documents (e.g., internal DoD memos and communications) and 
secondary documents (e.g., GAO reports) related to Better Buying Power. The purpose of 
this exercise was to corroborate and expand upon findings from the interviews. It should be 
stressed, however, that this work is preliminary. The interviewee sample is neither 
sufficiently large nor selected in such a way as to represent the entirety of stakeholders in 
the defense acquisition process. Thus, this research should be considered part of a pilot 
study, a means of framing questions for more substantive investigation.  
Findings—BBP Impact 
Though not the sole purpose of the study, some effort was made to get a sense of 
BBP’s impact. Interviewees’ answers to questions about impact were revealing in their own 
right, and asking them proved an effective way of uncovering implementation challenges 
(e.g., by following up with questions about the sources of perceived impact or lack thereof).  
Overall, interviewees offered mix opinions about the impact of BBP. Some expressed 
enthusiasm, others doubt, and still others skepticism about even the possibility of a valid 
assessment. Even the most enthusiastic conceded that it could take considerable time to 
see BBP’s influence on the acquisition process, a view reflected in Under Secretary 
Kendall’s preface to the DoD’s June 2013 report on the performance of the defense 
acquisition system (hereafter the “June Report”):  
Readily available data allowed us to provide historical baselines on 
acquisition performance and some initial insights into whether performance 
has, or has not, improved recently. They also demonstrate that it can take 
many years to see the results of new policies. (DoD, 2013, p. iv; emphasis 
added) 
Those skeptical of impact assessment argued BBP is just too large and multifaceted 
to allow for a valid, holistic evaluation. The primary challenge in this regard, according to an 
oversight official, is measurement: 
[With respect to these reforms], how do you measure impact? [Reforms like] 
BBP are so broad, so interrelated that it’s hard to come up with good 
measures from a managerial perspective [that allow one] to say “yes, we can 
connect these actions with these outcomes and we know they are having a 
positive impact.” We assume, because of reviews and what not, that we can 
see changes in individual activities. [For example, you can] do a milestone 
review, a major services acquisition review, but that’s more anecdotal … a 
gut feel as opposed to having some quantitative basis for asserting “yes, we 
have made progress.” 
In the view of another oversight official, such an analysis would have to proceed on a 
disaggregated basis, involving examination of  
… very specific things, specific practices BBP is looking for. You look at it, 
and you see “Achieve Affordable Programs,” “Control Requirements, etc.” 
[Every] acquisition reform that’s ever been written has been driving at those. 
So I think you’d have to look very specifically at things like what type of 
contract was used in this situation, and has that changed from this point 
forward. [I think you’d have to] really do things like that—you can’t look at it at 
a macro level. 
Where do we stand with respect to our ability to do this kind of analysis? The June 
Report is a step in the right direction, and more such reporting could aid both DoD officials 
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and external stakeholders in formulating judgments about BBP’s effect on acquisition 
outcomes. For the time being, however, those outside the DoD must rely on a limited set of 
publicly available data to determine the efficacy of Better Buying Power.  
Perhaps the best source in this regard is the GAO’s recurring assessment of major 
weapons systems (also known as its “Quick Look” report—based on Selected Acquisition 
Reports), which measures performance with a consistent set of metrics on a year-over-year 
basis. The report speaks only to major weapons programs, but insofar as (i) these are 
among the most heavily emphasized programs in debates about defense acquisition policy, 
and (ii) many of BBP’s action items apply to weapon systems acquisition, as a first step 
toward approximating BBP’s impact, it may be worthwhile to investigate the performance of 
the major weapons portfolio over the years since BBP 1.0’s inception.  
Of course, such an assessment is highly suggestive—changes in both the aggregate 
portfolio and the individual programs reflect a variety of influences. Nonetheless, a top-level 
assessment of performance since BBP 1.0’s launch reveals some positive trends. For 
example, the GAO indicated in its 2013 assessment that “a majority of the [major] programs 
[assessed] gained buying power [in 2012] as their acquisition unit costs decreased” (GAO, 
2013, p. i), and “[c]ontinuing a positive trend over the past 4 years, newer acquisition 
programs [demonstrated] higher levels of knowledge at key decision points …” (GAO, 2013, 
p. i). In addition, most of the assessed programs employed practices called for by BBP, 
including establishing and holding to affordability requirements, as well as performing and 
identifying savings from should cost analyses. The 2012 installment of the Quick Look report 
(i.e., the assessment of the major weapons portfolio as of 2011) echoes this latter 
observation. A senior defense official I interviewed stressed the importance of should cost 
analysis in particular, arguing, 
… managers who have government funds to execute need to constantly be 
looking for better ways to get value for the money, and setting targets for 
themselves so that they improve their performance … the idea is that you 
should get a better business deal for the government. 
To the extent that getting the government a better business deal is the overarching 
thrust of BBP, it is perhaps unsurprising that acquisition personnel have begun to adopt (or 
make greater use of) should cost techniques. Nonetheless, it is not clear from the GAO’s 
reporting that every major program in a position to adopt these techniques has done so, and 
both should cost analysis and affordability requirements are single action items in a much 
larger reform program. Thus, establishing a sense of BBP’s broader impact—even on an 
anecdotal basis—is challenging at this point. And, given existing data limitations, a 
systematic analysis of individual action items is potentially beyond even the DoD’s internal 
capabilities. In his preface to the June Report, Under Secretary Kendall referenced gaps in 
the available data and announced an initiative to fill them. Until this effort is further 
underway, and the newly collected data (including both data on major programs and other 
activities—services acquisition, contracting, etc.) are (as appropriate) made available in 
either future installments of the June Report or other publicly available outlets, our ability to 
evaluate BBP is fundamentally limited.  
Fortunately, a rigorous impact evaluation is not necessary to gauge the prospects for 
change under Better Buying Power. As argued up to this point, examining BBP from an 
implementation perspective can shed valuable light on whether, where, and to what extent 
the initiative is likely to take hold. 
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Findings—BBP Implementation 
Interviewees consistently referenced issues with BBP’s implementation, and while 
not every individual referenced the same set of issues, their collective assessments can be 
classified usefully along the conceptual dimensions referenced in the previous sections—
policy content, organizational capacity, and managerial craft. As I have argued, and as I 
attempt to illustrate below, these factors constitute what I deem to be the primary 
impediments to institutionalizing Better Buying Power. Provided they can be surmounted, 
there is scope for optimism about the initiative’s sustainability. Thus, while my discussion of 
each factor centers on challenges, I also speak to steps that could or have been taken to 
address these challenges (and thus institutionalize BBP) going forward. 
Policy Content 
Policy content speaks to both the actual substance of a policy and how that policy is 
perceived among the relevant stakeholders.  
With respect to substance, a policy that “spells out internally consistent [objectives] 
with clarity and specificity, and includes [rewards] for compliance or punishments for non-
compliance [is] more likely to succeed in its implementation” (Goggin, 1986, p. 332). Given 
that BBP references multiple objectives, interviewees were asked to assess its internal 
consistency: Do the initiative’s objectives align well, or are there areas of conflict?  
Interviewees across the stakeholder categories agreed that BBP’s objectives are 
generally well aligned, and described them using words like “synergistic” and “working 
together” toward a common purpose. Even in areas of potential conflict, the individuals with 
whom I spoke were as likely to attribute the underlying tension to perverse incentives as to a 
flaw in BBP’s design. In the words of an oversight official, 
[Consider] promoting effective competition versus reducing cost in programs. 
A lot of times what’s coming up in programs [approaching] MD A or MD B, 
when they present an acquisition strategy, is that they say hey, we’d love to 
have more competition, but it’s going to cost us x billion dollars. It’s not cost 
effective, so we are going to sign a sole source contract to this vendor. I don’t 
know if that’s driven by countermanding [objectives] within BBP, or if folks are 
just using it to get things they want. 
Interviewees expressed greater concern about the availability of rewards to promote 
adherence to BBP. According to an industry stakeholder and former DoD acquisition official, 
Quite frankly, I don’t know how you incentivize any good performance 
nowadays given the [DoD] climate and culture under the sequester program. 
[While it’s still possible] to [remove] people from positions, or [in] the 
contracting world to take away warrants, or  [to take individuals] out of 
program management positions … I don’t want to say that everyone can do a 
bad job and get away with it now because of sequestration, but it’s just harder 
to reward good performance I guess. You know, all the sticks are still here, 
it’s just the carrot side that’s lacking right now. 
With respect to policy perception—the degree to which the policy “fits with existing 
beliefs and practices, is perceived as helping rather than hurting the interests of those 
involved in implementation, and distributes benefits widely enough to result in a minimal 
coalition of interests who are committed to making good on the policy as intended” (Goggin, 
1986, p. 331)—interviewees were even more pessimistic, expressing concerns about how 
BBP is viewed among both the government workforce and industry.  
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With regard to the government workforce, for example, an oversight official argued 
program personnel may not view leaders’ pronouncements about expectations and 
consequences for failing to adopt a given practice (i.e., pronouncements about the “sticks”) 
as credible commitments. Given the relatively short tenure of BBP’s sponsors vis-à-vis those 
tasked with putting the initiative into place (program managers, contracting officers, etc.), a 
senior DoD official cautioned that the workforce may simply wait out the leadership’s efforts 
so as to maintain the status quo. In their words, 
I don’t think you can get anything done here in a year or two. I don’t think it’s 
possible. The whole system will wait you out. They’ll just nod their heads [and 
carry on with business as usual]. 
Even among those amenable to change, interviewees thought a “wait it out dynamic” 
may take hold—especially if short-term leaders fail to follow through on their commitments 
and to distribute the benefits and costs inherent to BBP practices in manner deemed fair. An 
oversight official spoke thoughtfully to this issue: 
[If I’m a program manager, my budget is how I get my mission done. And, if 
you’re going to take away some of my budget, is that pain going to be equally 
distributed to other folks? I want to be a good soldier, come up and do all 
these things that cut whatever my service is to the bone, or reduce it, or 
reduce my flexibility, [but what if] all the sudden I find my brethren in the 
Navy, or the Army let’s say if I’m an Air Force guy, and they’re not taking their 
lumps? They are not part of that effort. And so here I am, trying to manage 
my program much more cost consciously, trying to reduce my expenditures 
[and] my footprint, and trying to live within [my means]. And all of a sudden I 
find all these other programs that are going poorly, they are not giving up 
their money, people and programs and what not … do they get the money to 
cover or make up for short falls? A couple programs going through the 
acquisition cycle right now … they’ve greatly exceeded their baseline cost 
estimates and are way behind schedule. The question becomes, and 
everyone pays attention to this, will those programs now get extended and 
receive more funds so they can make it through the system? [In some cases, 
yes] … so if I see other folks doing just fine, and they’re not following the 
rules, [I might] not either. 
As these remarks suggest, a key to institutionalizing BBP is creating, adhering to, 
and conveying a sense of accountability. Decision-makers need not treat every case in the 
same way, but at the very least must play according to their own rules and past statements. 
To the extent they do not, they risk undermining their efforts. Change, especially in a system 
that structures individuals’ incentives so strongly in favor of the status quo, is very difficult. 
Getting the workforce on board (even those open to a new way of doing business) is all the 
harder if there is not a presumption of accountability for actions. To the extent leaders make 
decisions that violate any implicit agreements about accountability (what some call 
“relational contracts”—see Gibbons & Henderson, 2012), they should at the very least 
communicate their rationale—widely and substantively—and express their continued 
commitment to the change effort. This still may create frustration among the workforce, but 
is less likely to prompt outright abandonment by those on whom sustained implementation 
depends. 
Among industry, perception problems centered primarily on the stated intentions of 
BBP vis-à-vis the actual substance, and disconnects between the two. Industry stakeholders 
noted in particular that while BBP stresses incentives for productivity and innovation, it does 
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not address several long-standing impediments to doing business with the Pentagon. For 
instance, according to a manager at a large contractor,  
[In the United States], we used to have segregated work facilities. Congress 
did a good thing. They passed a law saying “if you use federal dollars, you 
will certify that you have non-segregated work facilities.” So now, every 
contract requires a certificate of non-segregated work facilities. Well, that was 
probably good up through 1980. But we don’t need that anymore. So you 
have a set of rules and regulations that keep getting piled on top of each 
other without a “do we really need this?” It’s simply another transaction cost. 
It goes through the FAR down to all the subcontractors. 
In addition to the complications of carrying out awarded business, industry 
stakeholders (as well as some individuals in government) referenced what they view as 
deficiencies in how the DoD measures and manages its costs, and the implications for 
securing business that they believe they could do more cheaply in some cases. According to 
one interviewee,  
Look at a business, and they’ll say, alright, we’re going to do this. Buy this. 
Manufacture this. Provide this service. Whatever. And they will actually flow 
out [all of the costs incurred] to get them there. … Now ask government, 
what’s my cost? [And often] they’ll have some nice numbers behind it. But 
when you push back at them and say, “ok, really show me those costs”—
[infrastructure, retirement and benefits, etc.], they would say “no, no, no, 
that’s not my cost.” Yes! That is your cost of delivery. 
This individual echoed several others in pointing to a larger cultural divide that 
differentiates public and private sector conceptions of cost. A defense official put it 
succinctly, noting, 
In the commercial world you’re very cost conscious. You’re always trying to 
affect the bottom line. Everybody in the corporation has the same metric 
about what represents good. In DoD, and government in general, the metric 
is have you spent your money yet. It’s a spending culture, right? And we 
review people every year for their execution—are they spending the money 
fast enough? And we have targets, and we punish people for not spending 
fast enough. And that’s totally in the face of what we are trying to accomplish. 
To the extent improving the government’s ability to derive value from its acquisition 
activities—including conceiving of and measuring cost in a manner more akin to the private 
sector, and where appropriate, relying more on the private sector to perform otherwise costly 
support functions—requires a cultural adjustment, interviewees (especially on the industry 
side) did not feel BBP goes far enough. 
Of course, a written policy cannot in and of itself affect a cultural transformation and 
attendant changes in behavior. That requires committed leadership and a willingness to 
change on the part of those at whom change is targeted. If leader tenure is short and the 
incentives for the status quo intense, however, what is to be done? Here, I think leaders can 
employ (and to an extent, have already employed) a mix of shorter and longer run strategies 
to facilitate and institutionalize the kind of culture change they are after.  
In the short run, they can exercise their available authority to mitigate incentives 
perpetuating undesirable behavioral patterns (which, if allowed to persist long enough, 
translate into shared understandings about how business is done—i.e., into culture). Under 
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Secretary Kendall’s and Under Secretary Hale’s September 2012 memo on effective 
management of unobligated funds is a sound step in this regard.  
Over the longer run, leaders can leverage available knowledge diffusion mechanisms 
to transfer their ideas. For example, an interviewee representing the epistemic community 
noted that the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) network is an especially effective 
means of incorporating leaders’ policy preferences in a classroom setting. Indeed, in this 
individual’s view, “the immediacy with which DAU can disseminate information” makes it an 
extremely valuable asset—one not present (at least not in its current form or capacity) to 
support reform efforts in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Organizational Capacity  
Organizational capacity represents the degree to which organizations can implement 
policy through their formal structures and processes (Goggin, 1986; Ting, 2011), or the 
arrangements by which they coordinate and control work activities, define standard 
operating procedures, divide labor, and otherwise “govern exchanges among internal 
players (executives, managers, employees)” (Bolman & Deal, 1997, as quoted in Hill & 
Lynn, 2009, p. 138).  
Given the importance of these arrangements to defense acquisition, including the 
implementation of acquisition reforms, a concerted effort was made to garner from 
interviewees how they thought the DoD’s internal organizational capacity bore on the 
implementation of Better Buying Power. Their responses suggest the degree to which BBP 
practices are implemented could vary considerably by both product type and component.  
Owing to established governance mechanisms—milestone assessments, portfolio 
reviews, and procedures intended to promote jointness and reduce unnecessary overlap in 
capabilities (e.g., configuration steering boards)—interviewees suggested the DoD’s 
components will be better able to implement BBP in hardware acquisition than in the 
acquisition of services (where these mechanisms are largely absent). As a senior DoD 
official noted,  
Part of my problem is that I am so many layers removed from the real work. 
[And that’s especially problematic] in services, because that money is 
generally spent in a very different way than [it is on] products … it’s so 
diffuse, right? I can [usually] look at a program and say “ok, it has a 
reasonable schedule, etc., etc.” and make sure it’s set up for success as 
much as possible. It’s a lot harder to do that with a services contract. 
In addition to the absence of robust oversight mechanisms, interviewees noted a 
more general propensity to define and conceptualize “acquisition” exclusively in hardware 
terms. According to an academic interviewee,  
There is just a long, long way to go to elevate the management of services 
and the acquisition of services to its proper level. We don’t have a way to 
train program managers to manage service acquisitions. We don’t think in 
terms of verification or testing of services. We don’t think of how [we are] 
going to maintain the service over time in the same way we think of weapons 
acquisition. The whole mind set, the set of phases and milestones … that’s all 
focused on weapons systems. 
Combined with a lack of internal controls, this “hardware” (or “weapon systems”) 
mindset may go far in explaining the DoD’s relative inattention toward services acquisition. 
In and of themselves, therefore, the measures DoD leaders have taken through both BBP 
1.0 and BBP 2.0 to make services a top management priority, to create a taxonomy for the 
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purposes of classifying services with a uniform language, to bolster services purchasing 
capacity outside the established acquisition chain (e.g., among installation commanders 
otherwise concerned with base operations), and related steps, are all needed and welcome. 
That said, interviewees across all three stakeholder categories felt services will pose an 
ongoing challenge. An oversight official painted an especially bleak picture, arguing, 
The [services acquisition] process is going to take years to get under control. 
[It’s] kind of the last hold-over in terms of non-centralized money 
management, [as] each of the individual base commanders [has] a pot of 
money to use as they see fit. There is no good way to track [their purchasing 
behavior nor to] get the services to work together to leverage their buying 
power and make more strategic decisions about how they manage services. 
[Not only do we lack] the structures we have in place on the weapons system 
side … we lack a basic [organizational] and management structure with the 
incentives to hold folks accountable for their decisions. 
Even where such structures are present—as on the weapons system side—
interviewees still registered concerns about capacity. Individuals across the stakeholder 
categories cautioned that the military departments could respond to and operationalize BBP 
very differently in the management of their own programs. Of course, such variability is to an 
extent unavoidable, and not necessarily undesirable if the adjustments are made in 
accordance with each service’s needs and circumstances. Nonetheless, on initiatives cutting 
across service lines, interviewees remained wary of the potential for differences in 
implementation. Citing configuration steering boards as an historical example, an oversight 
official noted, 
The Army had gone in letter by letter and said, “alright, we have to do this, 
this, and this,” and they even found some other things they could do to help 
out. The Air Force quite literally said “do what now?” And the Navy basically 
just took it, looked at the practices they had in place, and said “ah, we’ve 
pretty much got this covered” regardless of whether [their existing 
procedures] did indeed cover all the relevant pieces. And this happens all the 
time, on all of these different reform initiatives that go through. 
Interviewees attributed such differences in part to structure (i.e., to organizational 
capacity), but also to culture and leadership.  
Structurally, for instance, interviewees representing both government and industry 
suggested the manner in which the Navy organizes much of its acquisition activities—across 
multiple systems commands (NavSea, NavAir, SpaWar, NavFac, NavSup) as opposed to 
one materiel command (Army Materiel Command or Air Force Materiel Command)—may 
give it some advantages in terms of diversifying its human capital and integrating its 
functional disciplines (requirements, budgeting, and procurement) across operational 
domains. Culturally, interviewee responses were more speculative. Service-wide differences 
in culture are well understood (e.g., see Builder, 1989), but a few individuals with whom I 
spoke also referenced differences in the cultures of specific buying commands—even within 
the same service. Whether these differences are themselves a function of leadership, or 
whether leadership directly influences acquisition approaches is an open question (though I 
suspect both mechanisms are at play). One could, for example, attribute the initial success 
of the Joint Improved Explosive Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to a culture of risk 
tolerance—as facilitated (and later argued) by General Montgomery Meigs. Alternatively, 
and in accordance with research on functional leadership (e.g., see Morgeson et al., 2010), 
JIEDDO’s success could be more directly attributable to aspects of General Meigs’s (and 
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subsequent directors’) own behaviors. Of course, it could also be that since JIEDDO is 
structurally a joint organization, it can harness some of the benefits alluded to in the above 
comments regarding the Navy.  
Whether and in what way formal structure operates in conjunction with culture and 
leadership, it is hard to deny the importance of structural configurations in shaping 
implementation capacity. Thus, with respect to institutionalizing Better Buying Power, DoD 
leaders should at least be cognizant of structural antecedents to variation in implementation 
outcomes. Their tools are limited in this regard—they can more readily adjust BBP than the 
organizations through which it filters—but nonetheless, being aware of potential structural 
impediments and targeting resources and effort accordingly can aid in imbedding the long-
term behavioral change sought under the BBP initiative.  
Managerial Craft 
Interviewees consistently cited managerial craft—skilled application of individual 
strategic, tactical, and technical capabilities and competencies (Hill & Lynn, 2009)—as 
crucial to successful implementation of Better Buying Power. Rightfully so, as 
notwithstanding the importance of policy content and organizational capacity, people are the 
key lynchpin in any implementation effort. Indeed, as Goggin (1986) argues, skilled 
management can make for effective implementation of evenly poorly conceived policies. 
Managerial acumen can mean the difference between getting policies with vague or 
conflicting mandates into place, or letting them whither on the vine; between negotiating 
dysfunctional organizational arrangements or being suffocated by them; between learning 
from past experience or remaining locked in to a status quo mindset. 
The primary concern interviewees raised with respect to managerial craft was a 
tension between (i) leaders who view (and label) BBP as a “guide to help you think,” and (ii) 
the larger workforce, some of whom may view BBP as a set of rules—or at least as an 
implicit signal of leadership preferences. Reflecting on the leadership perspective, a senior 
defense official commented, 
[T]his is really not about “these are the right rules.” These [initiatives] are not 
the 10 commandments. 
Nonetheless, this individual acknowledged that in some cases BBP may be 
perceived as such, stating, 
[A]fter 1.0, [for example], a lot of people came back and said FPIF [Fixed-
Priced Incentive Fee], 100/120, 50–50 share line, that’s the answer. [When 
asked] why, they would say [the leadership said so]. That’s not an acceptable 
answer. 
Of course, Under Secretary Kendall and the rest of the leadership made an effort to correct 
this in BBP 2.0. They expressed a continued interest in FPIF, but otherwise stressed that it 
is not a panacea. Instead, they argued, the right contract type should be chosen given the 
situation. Sometimes this means using FPIF; other times it does not.  
Interviewees praised Kendall for making this adjustment, and argued more generally 
that such flexibility constitutes a key advantage of BBP vis-à-vis reforms of other types (e.g., 
congressional legislation). Nonetheless, they remained skeptical about whether the existing 
acquisition system gives workforce personnel the proper training and incentives to balance 
multiple objectives in the course of making complex decisions. As an oversight official 
cautioned, 
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[Right now], too much is left to personality. It has to be the right guy doing the 
right thing, [but] the processes and oversight do not [necessarily] force that 
sort of thing—the incentives [just] aren’t there.  
Even among those with good intentions, an industry stakeholder cautioned that 
insufficient training and experience can still make for problems. Using the choice of 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) vs. proprietary technology as an illustration, this individual 
argued, 
COTS sounds great, but there is [not enough] understanding of what it means 
in implementation. Consider the Littoral Combat Ship. They actually use 
Roombas, the little vacuum cleaner. Perfect application of commercial-off-
the-shelf. If a Roomba does not clean up that bit of dust, a warfighter will not 
be jeopardized. But if the turbine doesn’t do what it is supposed to do at 
speed, and we’re pushing the edge of the envelope to make that ship go fast, 
well then the crew is jeopardized. You can’t afford that. So [the choice of 
COTS vs. proprietary] has to be thoughtful. 
This is, of course, a stylized example, but it speaks to the issue alluded to above: Getting 
value out of acquisition is a balancing act. Decisions cannot be based solely on the premise 
of maximizing performance, minimizing risk, or fielding the most affordable solution. Often, in 
fact, this is not possible. A senior defense official offered a thoughtful example: 
We had a program to develop common avionics at one point, 15–20 years 
ago. [Between the] Air Force, the Navy, and the Army, we all have things that 
fly … [a]nd the idea is that we would have common avionics technology. [W]e 
got deeply into the design, at the time, of the F-22 and the Army’s Comanche 
helicopter program. And what we found out as we were way into this process 
was that the connectors that connected the circuit cards on each platform had 
to experience very different vibration environments. So the connector 
technology [that worked on one platform did not work on the other]. So things 
like that, reality, tends to drive you away from commonality, despite your best 
efforts. 
Again, value is a multi-faceted concept, and entails understanding trade-offs 
between cost, capability, and risk. As Under Secretary Kendall argued in the preface to the 
June Report,  
Our ultimate measure of performance is providing effective systems to the 
warfighter that are suitable for fielding, at costs that are affordable, while 
ensuring taxpayers’ money is spent as productively as possible. (DoD, June 
2013, p. iv).  
How can leaders cultivate this perspective among the workforce? The challenge is 
stark, but promoting value consciousness and more thoughtful decision-making is not an 
impossible task. The need to strengthen workforce capacity is well understood, and is 
arguably the only sustainable route to enhancing managerial craft. In the short run, however, 
leaders can buttress longer term capacity building efforts in variety of ways. Perhaps most 
importantly, they can harness their available communication outlets—memos and directives, 
required reviews and assessments, impromptu office visits, etc.—to continue driving home 
the message. Moreover, they can use each encounter with the workforce as an opportunity 
to transfer (or take in) new knowledge, to communicate lessons learned, and to praise 
exemplary work. Much of this is being done already, but more cannot hurt. Especially as 
BBP evolves—from the initial 1.0 rollout, to the 2.0 transition, to a potential release of 
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version 3.0—it is imperative that leaders capture and disseminate best practices. The 
workforce is already inundated with information, but targeted communication of top 
management priorities—with emphasis on knowledge transfer—can help those working 
under short tenures to have a longer term impact.  
Conclusion 
Defense acquisition reform is a now decades-long endeavor, and Better Buying 
Power just the latest manifestation in a long line of attempts to improve acquisition 
performance. That said, after over 10 years of combat, and with budgets shrinking, the BBP 
initiatives are arguably a well-timed and relevant attempt at change. But is this time really 
different?  
Perhaps. As argued, however, assessing the prospects for change requires looking 
at the problem from a different perspective. Leadership matters, but leaders’ efforts must be 
placed in a larger context. Policy is not self-executing, and the success of organizational 
change initiatives—policies with material implications for an organization’s various 
constituencies—depends importantly on effective implementation. In this paper, I identified 
the challenges of implementing Better Buying Power along three dimensions—policy 
content, organizational capacity, and managerial craft—which I believe represent the 
primary impediments to institutionalizing the initiative. Provided they can be surmounted, the 
prospects for change are real and viable.  
Leaders can take a number of actions in this regard, including creating and 
conveying a sense of accountability, addressing incentives that perpetuate undesirable 
behavioral patterns, facilitating knowledge transfer, accounting for the structural 
complexities of the organizations within which BBP is put into place, and striving to cultivate 
managerial acumen—buttressed by the idea that value is not one dimensional, but rather a 
product of balancing multiple factors—among the workforce.  
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